Chosen-ciphertext security is by now a standard security property for asymmetric encryption. Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. This paper presents an automated procedure for analyzing generic asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare-Rogaway 1993, of Pointcheval at PKC'2000 and REACT.
Introduction
Our day-to-day lives increasingly depend upon information and our ability to manipulate it securely. This requires solutions based on cryptographic systems (primitives and protocols). In 1976, Diffie and Hellman invented public-key cryptography, coined the notion of one-way functions and discussed the relationship between cryptography and complexity theory. Shortly after, the first cryptosystem with a reductionist security proof appeared (Rabin 1979) . The next breakthrough towards formal proofs of security was the adoption of computational security for the purpose of rigorously defining the security of cryptographic schemes. In this framework, a system is provably secure if there is a polynomial-time reduction proof from a hard problem to an attack against the security of the system. The provable security framework has been later refined into the exact (also called concrete) security framework where better estimates of the computational complexity of attacks are achieved. While research in the field of provable cryptography has achieved tremendous progress towards rigorously defining the functionalities and requirements of many cryptosystems, little has been done for developing computer-aided proof methods or more generally for investigating a proof theory for cryptosystems as it exists for imperative programs, concurrent systems, reactive systems, etc...
In this paper, we present an automated proof method for analyzing generic asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model (ROM). Generic encryption schemes aim at transforming schemes with weak security properties, such as one-wayness, into schemes with stronger security properties, especially security against chosen ciphertext attacks. Examples of generic encryption schemes are [11, 22, 20, 7, 5, 18, 17, 16] . The paper contains two main contributions. The first one is a compositional Hoare logic for proving IND-CPA-security. That is, we introduce a simple programming language (to specify encryption algorithms that use one-way functions and hash functions) and an assertion language that allows to state invariants and axioms and rules to establish such invariants. Compositionality of the Hoare logic means that the reasoning follows the structure of the program that specifies the encryption oracle. The assertion language consists of three atomic predicates. The first predicate allows us to express
Definitions
We are interested in analyzing generic schemes for asymmetric encryption assuming ideal hash functions. That is, we are working in the random oracle model [13, 7] . Using standard notations, we write H r ← Ω to denote that H is randomly chosen from the set of functions with appropriate domain. By abuse of notation, for a list H = H 1 , · · · , H n of hash functions, we write H r ← Ω instead of the sequence H 1 r ← Ω, . . . , H n r ← Ω. We fix a finite set H = {H 1 , . . . , H n } of hash functions and also a finite set Π of trapdoor permutations and O = Π ∪ H. We assume an arbitrary but fixed ordering on Π and H; just to be able to switch between set-based and vector-based notation. A distribution ensemble is a countable sequence of distributions {X η } η∈N . We only consider distribution ensembles that can be constructed in polynomial time by probabilistic algorithms that have oracle access to O. Given two distribution ensembles
A simple programming language for encryption and decryption oracles
We introduce a simple programming language without loops in which the encryption and decryption oracles are specified. The motivation for fixing a notation is obvious: it is mandatory for developing an automatic verification procedure. Let Var be an arbitrary finite non-empty set of variables. Then, our programming language is built according to the following BNF described in Table 1 , where for a bit-string bs = b 1 . . . b k (b i are bits), bs[n, m] = b n . . . b m 1 , and N is the name of the oracle, c its body and x and y are the input and output variable respectively. Note the command y[n, m] is only used in the decryptions, it is why we do not have to consider it in our Hoare logic. With this language we can sample an uniform value to x, apply a one-way function f and its inverse f −1 , a hash function, the exclusive-or, the concatenation and substring function, and perform an "if-then-else" (used only in the decryption function). Example 1. The following command encodes the encryption scheme proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in [7] (shortly E(in e ; out e ) = f (r)||in e ⊕ G(r)||H(in e ||r)): Semantics: In addition to the variables in Var, we consider variables T H 1 , . . . , T Hn . Variable T H i records the queries to the hash function H i and can not be accessed by the adversary.
Thus, we consider states that assign bit-strings to the variables in Var and lists of pairs of bit-strings to T H i . For simplicity of the presentation, we assume that all variables range over large domains, whose cardinalities are exponential in the security parameter η. u r ← U is the uniform sampling of a value u from the appropriate domain. Given a state S, S(T H ).dom, respectively S(T H ).res, denotes the list obtained by projecting each pair in S(T H ) to its first, respectively second, element.
A program takes as input a configuration (S, H, (f, f −1 )) and yields a distribution on configurations. A configuration is composed of a state S, a vector of hash functions (H 1 , . . . , H n ) and a pair (f, f −1 ) of a trapdoor permutation and its inverse. Let Γ denote the set of configurations and Dist(Γ ) the set of distributions on configurations. The semantics is given in Table 2 , where δ(x) denotes the Dirac measure, i.e. Pr(x) = 1. Notice that the semantic function of commands can be lifted in the usual way to a function from Dist(Γ ) to Dist(Γ ). By abuse of notation we also denote the lifted semantics by [[c] ]. 
). According to our semantics, commands denote functions that transform distributions on configurations to distributions on configurations. However, only distributions that are constructible are of interest. Their set is denoted by Dist(Γ, H, F) and is defined as the set of distributions of the form:
accessing f , f −1 and H and which records its queries to hashing oracles into the T H 's in S.
Asymmetric Encryption
We are interested in generic constructions that convert any trapdoor permutation into a public-key encryption scheme. More specifically, our aim is to provide an automatic verification method for generic encryption schemes. We also adapt IND-CPA and IND-CCA security notions to our setting.
Definition 1.
A generic encryption scheme is defined by a triple (F, E(in e , out e ) : c, D(in d , out d ) : c ) such that: -F is a trapdoor permutation generator that on input η generates an η-bitstring trapdoor c ). Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary and X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F). For α ∈ {cpa, cca} and η ∈ N,
We insist, above, that A 1 outputs x 0 , x 1 such that |x 0 | = |x 1 | and that in the case of CCA, A 2 does not ask its oracle D to decrypt S (y). We say that GE is IND-α secure if Adv ind−α A,GE (η, X) is negligible for any constructible distribution ensemble X and polynomial-time adversary A.
IND-CPA security
In this section, we present an effective procedure to verify IND-CPA security. The procedure may fail to prove a secure encryption scheme but never declares correct an insecure one. Thus, we sacrifice completeness for soundness, a situation very frequent in verification 2 . We insist that our procedure does not fail for any of the numerous constructions we tried.
We are aiming at developing a procedure that allows us to prove properties, i.e. invariants, of the encryption oracle. More precisely, the procedure annotates each control point of the encryption command with a set of predicates that hold at that point for any execution except with negligible probability. Given an encryption oracle E(in e , out e ) : c we want to prove that at the final control point, we have an invariant that tells us that the value of out e is indistinguishable from a random value. Classically, this implies IND-CPA security.
A few words now concerning how we present the verification procedure. First, we present in the assertion language the invariant properties we are interested in. Then, we present a set of rules of the form {ϕ}c{ϕ }, meaning that execution of command c in any distribution that satisfies ϕ leads to a distribution that satisfies ϕ . Using Hoare logic terminology, this means that the triple {ϕ}c{ϕ } is valid.
From now on, we suppose that the adversary has access to the hash functions H, and he is given the trapdoor permutation f , but not its inverse f −1 .
The Assertion Language
Our assertion language is defined by the following grammar, where ψ defines the set of atomic assertions:
ψ ::= Indis(νx;
where V 1 , V 2 ⊆ Var and e is an expression constructible (by the adversary) out of the variables used in the program, that is to say, possibly using concatenation, xor, hash oracles or f . Moreover, we define the set of the variables used as substring of an expression e and denote it subvar(e): x ∈ subvar(e) iff e = e 1 ||x||e 2 , for some expressions e 1 and e 2 . For example, we use the predicate H(H, R||in e ||f (R||r)||in e ⊕ G(R)), for which, if we denote this latter expression e, we can write subvar(e) = {R, in e }, since those variables are substrings of e, but r / ∈ subvar(e), since it cannot be obtained directly out of e.
Intuitively, Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ) is satisfied by a distribution on configurations, if any adversary has negligible probability to distinguish whether he is given results of computations performed using the value of x or a random value, when he is given the values of the variables in V 1 and the image by the one-way permutation of those in V 2 . The assertion WS(x; V ) is satisfied by a distribution, if any adversary has negligible probability to compute the value of x, when he is given the values of the variables in V . Finally, H(H, e) is satisfied when the value of e has not been submitted to the hash oracle H.
Notations: We use Indis(νx; V ) instead of Indis(νx; V ; ∅) and Indis(νx) instead of Indis(νx; Var). We also write V, x instead of V ∪ {x} and even x, y instead of {x, y}.
Formally, the meaning of the assertion language is defined by a satisfaction relation X |= ϕ, which tells us when a distribution on configurations X satisfies the assertion ϕ. In order to define the satisfaction relation X |= ϕ, we need to generalize indistinguishability as follows.
Let X be a family of distributions in Dist(Γ, H, F) and V 1 and V 2 be sets of variables in Var.
By D(X, V 1 , V 2 ) we denote the following distribution family (on tuples of bit-strings):
Here S(V 1 ) is the point-wise application of S to the elements of V 1 and f (S(V 2 )) is the point-wise application of f to the elements of S(V 2 ). We say that X and X are V 1 ;
Example 2. Let S 0 be any state and let H 1 be a hash function. Recall that we are working in the ROM. Consider the following distributions:
, and p is a polynomial. Then, we have X ∼ {y};{x} X but we do not have X ∼ {y,x};∅ X , because then the adversary can query the value of H 1 (x) and match it to that of y.
The satisfaction relation X |= ψ is defined as follows:
The relation between our Hoare triples and semantic security is established by the following proposition that states that if the value of out e is indistinguishable from a random value then the scheme considered is IND-CPA. Indeed, if {true}c{Indis(νout e ; out e , in e )} holds then the encryption scheme is secure with respect to randomness of ciphertext. It is standard that randomness of ciphertext implies IND-CPA security.
A Hoare Logic for IND-CPA security
In this section we present our Hoare logic for IND-CPA security. We begin with a set of preservation rules that tell us when an invariant established at the control point before a command can be transferred to the next control point. Then, for each command, except x := f −1 (y), x := y[n, m] and conditional, we present a set of specific rules that allow us to establish new invariants. The commands that are not considered are usually not used in encryption but only in decryption procedures, and hence, are irrelevant with respect to our way of proving IND-CPA security.
Generic preservation rules:
We assume z = x and c is either x r ← U or x := y||t or x = y ⊕t or x := f (y) or x := H(y) or x := t ⊕ H(y). Lemma 1. The following rules are sound, when x ∈ V 1 ∪ V 2 : Random Assignment:
The following rules are sound:
Moreover, the following preservation rules, where we assume x = y 3 , are sound:
Rule (R1) is obvious. Rule (R2) takes advantage of the fact that U is a large set, or more precisely that its cardinality is exponential in the security parameter, and that since e contains the fresh generated x the probability that it has already been submitted to H is small. Rules (R3) and (R4) state that the value of x cannot help an adversary in distinguishing the value of y from a random value in (R3) or computing its value in (R4). This is the case because the value of x is randomly sampled. Rule (H1) captures the main feature of the random oracle model, namely that the hash function is a random function. Hence, if an adversary cannot compute the value of y and this latter has not been hashed yet then he cannot distinguish H(y) from a random value. Rule (H2) is similar to rule (R2). Rule (H3) uses the fact that the value of y can not be queried to the hash oracle.
Lemma 4. The following preservation rules are sound provided that x = y and z = x:
The idea behind (H4) is that to the adversary the value of x is seemingly random so that it can not help to compute z. Rule (H5) states that the value of e not having been hashed yet reminds true as long as e contains a variable z whose value is not computable out of y. (H6) and (H7) give necessary conditions to the preservation of indistinguishability that is based on the seemingly randomness of a hash value.
One-way Function: Lemma 5. The following rule is sound, when y ∈ V ∪ {x}:
Rule (O1) captures the one-wayness of f . Lemma 6. The following rules are sound when z = x:
For one-way permutations, we also have the following rule:
is obvious since f (y) is given to the adversary in the precondition and rule (O3) follows from the fact that y and z are independent. Rule (P1) simply ensues from the fact that f is a permutation.
The Xor operator In the following rules, we assume y = z. Lemma 7. The following rule is sound when y ∈ V 1 ∪ V 2 :
Moreover, we have the following rules that are sound provided that t = x, y, z.
To understand rule (X1) one should consider y as a key and think about x as the one-time pad encryption of z with the key y. Rules (X2) and (X3) take advantage of the fact that is easy to compute x given y and z.
Concatenation:
Lemma 8. The following rules are sound:
(C1) states that if computing a substring of x out of the elements of V is hard, then so is computing x itself. The idea behind (C2) is that y and z being random implies randomness of x, with respect to V 1 and V 2 . Eventually, x being easily computable from y and z accounts for rules (C3) and (C4).
In addition to the rules above, we have the usual sequential composition and consequence rules of the Hoare logic. In order to apply the consequence rule, we use entailment (logic implication) between assertions as in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. Let X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F) be a distribution ensemble:
The soundness of the Hoare Logic follows by induction from the soundness of each rule and soundness of the Consequence and Sequential composition rules.
Proposition 2. The Hoare triples given in Section 3.2 are valid. Example 3. We illustrate our proposition with Bellare & Rogaway's generic construction [7] .
1) (R1), (R2), and (R2). 2) (P 1), (O1), (G3), and (G3). 3) (H7), (H1), (H4), and (G3). 4) (X2), (X1), (X3), and (G3). 5) (G1), (G1), (C1), and (G3). 6) (H7), (H7), and (H1). 7) (C2) twice.
Extensions
In this section, we show how our Hoare logic, and hence our verification procedure, can be adapted to deal with on one hand injective partially trapdoor one-way functions and on the other hand OW-PCA (probabilistic) functions. The first extension is motivated by Pointcheval's construction in [17] and the second one by the Rapid Enhanced-security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform (REACT) [16] .
The first observation we have to make is that Proposition 1 is too demanding in case f is not a permutation. Therefore, we introduce a new predicate Indis f (νx; V 1 ; V 2 ) whose meaning is as follows:
X |= Indis f (νx;
Notice that, when f is a bijection, Indis f (νx; V 1 ; V 2 ) is equivalent to Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ) (f can be the identity function as in the last step of Example 4 and 5). Now, let out e , the output of the encryption oracle, have the form a 1 || · · · ||a n with a i = f i (x i ). Then, we can prove the following:
Now, we introduce a new rule for Indis f (νx; V 1 ; V 2 ) that replaces rule (P1) in case the one-way function f is not a permutation:
Clearly all preservation rules can be generalized for Indis f . Injective partially trapdoor one-way functions: In contrast to the previous section, we do not assume f to be a permutation. On the other hand, we demand a stronger property than one-wayness. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function and let f −1 : Z → X be such that
Here f −1 is a partial function. The function f is said partially one-way, if for any given z = f (x, y), it is computationally impossible to compute a corresponding x. In order to deal with the fact that f is now partially one-way, we add the following rules, where we assume x, y ∈ V ∪ {z} and where we identify f and (x, y) → f (x||y):
The intuition behind the first part of (PO1) is that f guarantees one-way secrecy of the x-part of x||y. The second part follows the same idea that (P1').
Example 4. We verify Pointcheval's transformer [17] .
1) (R1) and (R2); 2) (R3), (R1), (G3) and (R2); 3) (C3), (C1), (G3), and (G3); 4) (H7), (H1), and (G3); 5) New rule (P O1) and (G3); 6) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , and (H1); 7) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , and (G1).
To conclude, we use the fact that Indis f (νa; a, in e ) and Indis(νb; a, b, in e ) implies Indis f (νa; a, b, in e ) OW-PCA: Some constructions such as REACT are based on probabilistic one-way functions that are difficult to invert even when the adversary has access to a plaintext checking oracle (PC), which on input a pair (m, c), answers whether c encrypts m. In order to deal with OW-PCA functions, we need to strengthen the meaning of our predicates allowing the adversary to access to the additional plaintext checking oracle. For instance, the definition of WS(x; V ) becomes:
is negligible, for any adversary A. Now, we have to revisit Lemma 9 and the rules that introduce WS(x; V ) in the postcondition. It is, however, easy to check that they are valid.
2) (R3), (R1), (R2) and (R2) 3) (P O1), (G3) and (G3). 4) Extension of (H7) to Indis f , (H1), (H4), and (G3). 5) Extension of (X2) to Indis f , (X1), (X3), and (G3). 6) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , (G1), (C1), and (G3). 7) Extension of (H7) to Indis f , (H7), and (H1). 8) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , (G1) and (G1). decipher messages often allows to bypass the computation of the inverse of the one-way function used in the scheme. Indistinguishability itself is a far more difficult property to achieve, since giving f (V 2 ) may permit the adversary to create ciphertexts he can then submit to the decryption oracle. This is why a change is required in the way to carry out our proofs. In their article [4] , Bellare et al. list and compare the most classical security criteria. They show that IND-CCA security is implied by IND-CPA security of a scheme plus its plaintext awareness. This is the way we choose to deal with IND-CCA.
Introduction Of Plaintext Awareness
Plaintext awareness (PA) was first introduced in [5] , but its original definition was slightly weaker. It was then refined in [4] to be the following notion. The idea is that the adversary should not be able to obtain ciphertexts without knowing the corresponding plaintext. If it is the case, we can consider that he asks the encryption oracle to cipher them, so that we do not need to care much about this capacity since it is yet taken into account by the IND-CPA criterion. Queries to the decryption oracle are adding a new element to the knowledge of the adversary if he can ask the decryption of interesting ciphertexts, that is, some that he hasn't obtained from the encryption oracle. Otherwise functional correctness of the scheme imposes the result and the query is useless. In practice, an extra algorithm is introduced to define PA. This is the plaintext extractor K. As its name allows to suppose, it is meant to simulate the decryption algorithm. The idea is to say that if to any ciphertext the adversary manages to output, the plaintext extractor can associate the corresponding plaintext without asking anything to D, but only looking at the adversary's queries to hash oracles and the encryption algorithm, then the scheme is plaintext aware. That is to say, no poly-time adversary can output a ciphertext he couldn't decipher on his own.
Formally, an adversary B against PA security of a scheme outputs a list hH of his hash queries and their results, a list C of his queries to E, and a ciphertext y that he challenges the plaintext extractor to decipher. B wins if the plaintext extractor does not output the same thing as the decryption oracle. Otherwise, if y ∈ C (the adversary has cheated and output a ciphertext he obtained from E) or if K(y) is the same as D(y), K is the winner of the experiment. We thus define:
Definition 3 (Success Probability of the Plaintext Extractor). Let X be a distribution on configurations and GE be a generic scheme. Then the probability that the plaintext extractor K succeeds against adversary B is worth:
Now the formal definition of plaintext awareness is easy to state: 
Intuition on Means to Ensure Plaintext Awareness
Getting used to working with plaintext awareness, and trying to acquire an intuition about it on usual schemes, one can notice that a certain form of decryption algorithms are particularly well-suited for the verification of this criterion. The thing is, some decryption algorithms can be split into two parts: a first part that actually computes the plaintext out of the ciphertext, and a second one that checks whether the ciphertext was 'legally' obtained. This last verification, that we call the 'sanity check ', is the one ensuring PA (and hence IND-CCA) security. It allows to discriminate random bitstrings or ciphertexts that have been tampered with from valid ciphertexts output by the encryption algorithm.
More precisely, if we consider a scheme GE = (F, E, D(in d , out d ) : c ) using H = (H 1 , . . . , H n ), let us suppose that c has the following pattern: The idea behind such a test is simple: as a hash value cannot be forged (in the ROM), the hash oracle has to be queried on some t * , whose right value is meant to be computable by a normal execution of the encryption algorithm only. The challenge of a PA-adversary thus becomes to compute the right hash value, hence we can easily prove he has negligible probability of success. Nevertheless, soundness of such an argument requires the weak injectivity property we impose on V. Indeed, if a great number of values verified the sanity check, we would not be able to deduce from its validity that the adversary can compute the right hash value. The uniform distribution of argument r in the hypothesis on V is meant to simulate the distribution of hash values.
In practice, we need two more assumptions on the form of the program and the use of the variables. First, the encryption algorithm is supposed to make an unique call to H 1 on a variable t. Secondly, the value t * that D computes matches the value of t computed by E during a sound execution of the pair of algorithms. Figure 4 .2 illustrates this assumption of t and t * playing the same role in respectively the encryption and the decryption algorithm. Fig. 1 . The hypothesis about t and t * Hereafter, the reader can find the example of the scheme designed in 1993 by Bellare and Rogaway [7] , that illustrates the discussion above very well. To lighten the notations, we use directly a match command, that is not in the language, instead of doing it by hand by cutting the bitstring in three. The sanity check is highlighted in the code of the decryption oracle. Notice that this code indeed falls into two parts: first, the computation of the plaintext m * , that does not involve c * . This latter only serves the last test purpose, which is to ensure that the right value of t * , and thus the right values of m * and r * , have been computed. This conditional branching somewhat forces whoever attacks plaintext awareness of the scheme to invert f and query G on the result of the inversion itself; it creates an extremely strong link between the random seed and the plaintext by placing it under a hash function. 
Formal Semantic Criterion For Plaintext Awareness
We recall that we suppose the decryption oracle to be of the following form: c 1 ; h * := H 1 (t * ); if V(x, h * ) = v then out d := m * else out d := "error" fi, and that H 1 is called once in E on a variable t. On top of that, we require that if S r ← [[E]](in e ) and S := D(S(out e )), then S(t) = S (t * ). This last condition simply states that t and t * play the same role in both algorithms.
The intuition behind the semantic criterion is quite easily understandable. We are going to impose three conditions to ensure the ability to construct a plaintext extractor enjoying an overwhelming probability of success. That is to say, we design conditions to enable an efficient simulation of the decryption algorithm. We know that K, the plaintext extractor, is granted access to the list hH 1 of oracle queries of the adversary B to H 1 and their results. The idea is that, if K is able to select among hH 1 .dom the right value of t * the decryption algorithm would compute, then (looking at the example above where t * = m * ||r * ), the extraction of the plaintext is pretty likely to succeed (in the example selecting the prefix suffices!). Such a selection could be done by testing candidates to the sanity check one by one. Since there is only a polynomial number of queries (B queried the oracle and is poly-time), this takes a polynomial time. Therefore, showing the existence of K amounts to constructing an efficient tester. The first condition thus consists in assuming the existence of a poly-time algorithm called the tester, able to discriminate valid candidates to the sanity check from unsatisfactory ones. Then, we impose that the extraction of the plaintext be easily achievable from a good candidate. Eventually, to get rid of possible ambiguity, we add that to a value cd (for candidate) of t * corresponds at most one possible ciphertext, so that the extracted plaintext is indeed the one the decryption oracle outputs when verifying the sanity check on cd.
Here is the formal statement of the semantic criterion:
Definition 5 (PA Semantic Criterion). We say that GE satisfies the PA-semantic criterion, if there exist efficient algorithms T and Ext that satisfy the following conditions:
1. The tester T takes as input (hH, C, y, cd, f ) and returns a value in {0, 1}. We require that for any adversary B and any distribution X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F),
2. For Ext, we require that for any adversary B and any distribution X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F),
3. Finally, we require that for any adversary B and any distribution X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F),
If a scheme satisfies definition 5, given such a tester T and such an extraction algorithm Ext, the plaintext extractor can be constructed as follows: We can then demonstrate that our semantic criterion indeed implies plaintext awareness. Theorem 1. Let GE be a generic encryption scheme that satisfies the PA-semantic criterion. Then, GE is PA-secure.
Of course there are generic encryption schemes for which the conditions above are satisfied under the assumption that T has access to an extra oracle such as a plaintext checking oracle (PC), or a ciphertext validity-checking oracle (CV), which on input c answers whether c is a valid ciphertext. In this case, the semantic security of the scheme has to be established under the assumption that f is OW-PCA, respectively OW-CVA. Furthermore, our definition of the PA-semantic criterion makes perfect sense for constructions that apply to IND-CPA schemes such as Fujisaki and Okamoto's converter [14] . In this case, f has to be considered as the IND-CPA encryption oracle.
A Syntactic Criterion for Plaintext Awareness
An easy syntactic check that implies the PA-semantic criterion is as follows. Definition 6. A generic encryption scheme GE satisfies the PA-syntactic criterion, if the sanity check has the form V(t, h) = v, where D is such that h is assigned H 1 (t), t is assigned in e ||r, in e is the plaintext and E(in e ; r) is the ciphertext (i.e., r is the random seed of E).
It is not difficult to see that if GE satisfies the PA-syntactic criterion then it also satisfies the PA-semantic one with a tester T as follows (Ext is obvious):
Look in hH 1 for a bit-string s such that E(x * ; r * ) = y, where y is the challenge and x * ||r * = s.
Here are some examples that satisfy the syntactic criterion (we use · * to denote the values computed by the decryption oracle): The PA-semantic criterion applies to the following constructions but not the syntactic one:
Example 7. 
Automation
We can now fully automate our verification procedure of IND-CCA for the encryption schemes we consider as follows:
1. Automatically establish invariants 2. Check the syntactic criterion for PA.
Point 2 can be done by a simple syntactic analyzer taking as input the decryption program, but has not been implemented yet. Point 1 is more challenging. The idea is, for a given program, to compute invariants backwards, starting with the invariant Indis(νout e ; out e , in e ) at the end of the program.
As several rules can lead to a same postcondition, we in fact compute a set of sufficient conditions at all points of the program: for each set {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } and each instruction c, we can compute a set of assertions {φ 1 , . . . , φ m } such that 1. for i = 1, . . . , m, there exists j such that {φ i }c{φ j } can be derived using the rules given section 3.2, 2. and for all j and all φ such that {φ }c{φ j }, there exists i such that φ entails φ i and that this entailment relation can be derived using lemma 9.
Of course, this verification is potentially exponential in the number of instructions of the encryption program as each postcondition may potentially have several preconditions. However this is mitigated as the considered encryption scheme are generally implemented in a few instructions (around 10) we implement a simplification procedure on the computed set of invariants: if φ i entails φ j (for i = j), then we can safely delete φ i from the set of assertions {φ 1 , . . . , φ n }. In other words, we keep only the minimal preconditions with respect to strength in our computed set of invariants (the usual Hoare logic corresponds to the degenerated case where this set has a minimum element, called the weakest precondition).
In practice, checking Bellare & Rogaway generic construction is instantaneous. We implemented that procedure as an Objective Caml program, taking as input a representation of the encryption program. This program is only 230 lines long and is available on the web page of the authors.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed an automatic method to prove IND-CCA security of generic encryption schemes in the random oracle model. IND-CPA is proved using a Hoare logic and plaintext awareness using a syntactic criterion. It does not seem difficult to adapt our Hoare logic to allow a security proof in the concrete framework of provable security. Another extension of our Hoare logic could concern OAEP. Here, we need to express that the value of a given variable is indistinguishable from a random value as long as a value r has not been submitted to a hash oracle G. This can be done by extending the predicate Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ). The details are future work.
Notations used in the appendix.
-Let X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F). We define the distribution νx.X = [(S, H, (f, f −1 )) r ← X; u r ← U : (S{x → u}, H, (f, f −1 )]. Notice that consequently, X |= Indis(νx;
-For a hash function H, we let H{x → y} be the function mapping x to y (or S(x) to S(y)) and any other value v to H(v).
A Soundness of the Hoare Logic

A.1 Preliminaries
The properties Indis and WS are compatible with indistinguishability in the following sense:
Lemma 10. For any X, X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F), any sets of variables V 1 and V 2 , and any variable
x:
Proof. By symmetry of indistinguishability and equivalence, for each proposition, the conclusion follows from a single implication.
-We assume X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 X . Hence, νx.X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 νx.X , that can be justified by an immediate reduction. Moreover, the hypothesis X |= Indis(νx;
By transitivity of the indistinguishability relation, we get X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 νx.X . Thus, X |= Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ). -We prove that X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ) ⇒ X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ) by transposition. Indeed, if X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ) and X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ), there exists A a poly-time adversary that, on input V 1 and f (V 2 ) drawn from X , computes the right value for x with non-negligible probability. We let B be the following adversary against X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 ,x X :
The idea is to consider that A computes the right value of x whenever the values were taken from X , otherwise B answers he was provided with values from X. Thus, the advantage of B is greater than that of A, which contradicts X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 X .
An expression e is called constructible from (V 1 ; V 2 ), if it can be constructed from variables in V 1 and images by f of variables in V 2 , calling oracles if necessary. Obviously, we can give an inductive definition: if
; if e 1 , e 2 are constructible from (V 1 ; V 2 ) then H(e 1 ), f (e 1 ), e 1 ||e 2 and e 1 ⊕ e 2 are constructible from (V 1 ; V 2 ). Then Indis is preserved by constructible computings. We let B be the following adversary against X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 X :
The idea is that B can evaluate in polynomial time the expression e using its own inputs. Hence it can provide the appropriate inputs to A. It is clear that the advantage of B is exactly that of A, which would imply that it is not negligible, although we assumed X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 X . Corollary 1. For any X, X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F), any sets of variables V 1 and V 2 , any expression e constructible from (V 1 ; V 2 ), and any variable x, z such that z ∈ {x} ∪ Var(e) if X |= Indis(νz; V 1 ; V 2 ) then [[x := e]](X) |= Indis(νz; V 1 , x; V 2 ). We emphasize here that we suppose that here we use the notation Var(e) (in its usual sense), that is to say, the variable z does not appear at all in e.
Proof. X |= Indis(νz; Proof. If we suppose that [[x := e]](X) |= WS(z; V 1 , x; V 2 ), then there exists A a poly-time adversary that, on input V 1 , x and f (V 2 ) drawn from [[x := e]](X), computes the right value for z with non-negligible probability. We let B be the following adversary against X |= WS(z; V 1 ; V 2 ): B(V 1 , f (V 2 )):= let x := e in A(V 1 , x, f (V 2 )). Since A and B have the same advantage, we obtain a contradiction, so that [[x := e]](X) |= WS(z; V 1 , x; V 2 ) cannot be true.
A.2 Weakening Lemmas
Lemma 13. Let X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F) be a distribution:
Proof. The first pair of properties are quite straightforward: they are based on the fact that an adversary provided with less values of variables obviously turns out less powerful.
To prove the last assertion, we let X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F) such that X |= Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 , x).
Thus, X ∼ V 1 ;V 2 ∪{x} νx.X, so that with lemma 10, proving νx.X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {x}) allows to conclude. Besides, considering an adversary A against WS possibly querying f or the hashing functions,
, and the last probability is the advantage of an adversary trying to invert the one-way function f . This latter being negligible, we conclude that X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {x}).
A.3 Generic preservation rules
In this part, we assume that z = x and c is either x r ← U or x := y||t or x := y ⊕ t or x := f (y) or x := H(y) or x := t ⊕ H(y). Moreover,
Before getting started, let us notice that for any command c stated above, Lemma 14. For all distribution X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F) and all sets V 1 and V 2 such that x / Proof. This rule is just a way to state that νx.X |= Indis(νx), for the distributions coincide. Proof. The fact that x ∈ subvar(e) means that there exists a poly-time function g such that g(S(e)) = S(x) for any state S (namely g consists in extracting the right substring corresponding to x from the expression e). We are interested in bounding Proof. The intuition is that x being completely random, providing its value to the adversary does not help this latter in any way. We show the result by reduction. Assume that there exists an adversary B against [[x r ← U]](X) |= Indis(νy; V 1 , x; V 2 ) that can distinguish with nonnegligible advantage between y and a random value given the values of V 1 , x and f (V 2 ). Then, we can construct an adversary A(V 1 , f (V 2 )) playing against X |= Indis(νy; V 1 ; V 2 ) that has the same advantage as B: A(V 1 , f (V 2 )) draws a value u at random and runs B(V 1 , u, f (V 2 )), and then returns B's answer. If B has non-negligible advantage, then so does A, which contradicts our hypothesis. Proof. The previous reduction can be adapted in a straightforward way to prove this fourth rule.
A.5 Hash Rules
Preliminary Results In the random oracle model, hash functions are drawn uniformly at random from the space of functions of suitable type at the beginning of the execution of a program. Thus, the images that the hash function associates to different inputs are completely independent. Therefore, one can delay the draw of each hash value until needed. This is the very idea that the first lemma formalizes. It states that while a hash value has not been queried by the adversary, i.e. while H(H, y) remains true, then one can redraw it without this changing anything from the adversary's point of view. Then, we eventually replace the draw of y by that of x, and propagate the side effects of that change, to obtain another way to denote the same distribution:
Now, this last distribution is exactly rebind y →α⊕x H (νx · X), and we conclude. Now we are interested in formally proving the useful and intuitive following lemma, which states that to distinguish between a distribution and its 'rebound' version, an adversary must be able to compute the argument y whose hash value has been rebound. More precisely, Lemma 17 (Hash vs rebind). For any X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, F), any two variables x and y, any two finite sets of variables V 1 and V 2 , and any hash function H, if X |= WS(y; V 1 ; V 2 ), then
.
Proof. Consider finite sets V 1 and V 2 and a distribution X such that X |= WS(y; V 1 ; V 2 ). Once more, we omit to mention (f, f −1 ) in the state descriptions. The sole difference between the distributions is the value of H(y). Namely, An adversary trying to distinguish D(X, V 1 , V 2 ) from this last distribution can only succeed if it calls H on S(y). Nevertheless, the probability of an adversary computing S(y) is negligible since X |= WS(y; V 1 ; V 2 ). Therefore, D(rebind y →x
Proofs of the rules Thanks to the three lemmas of the previous part, that capture the important features of hash functions, we can know design fairly simple proofs of the soundness of our rules. 
and since xor is idempotent we can write: 
B Plaintext Awareness
Theorem 2. Let GE be a generic encryption scheme that satisfies the PA-semantic criterion. Then, GE is PA-secure.
Proof. We prove that the probability of K failing to simulate the decryption oracle is negligible rather than working with its probability of success: we show that is negligible. We proceed by decomposing our event in disjoint possible cases and bounding each probability. Indeed, several things can happen for K and D outputs to be different:
either y / ∈ C and out K = error and S (out d ) = error but out K = S (out d ), which we call Event I, either y / ∈ C and out K = error and S (out d ) = error, which we call Event II, or y / ∈ C and out K = error and S (out d ) = error, which we call Event III.
To lighten notations, we omit to write (S, H, (f, f −1 )) r ← X; (hH, C, y, S ) Let us first take care of Event I, that is, when y / ∈ C and out K = error, S (out d ) = error but out K = S (out d ). We consider all possible events that can result in those two different outputs.
-First, the tester T may answer 1 for a candidate cd whereas H 1 (cd) = H 1 (S (t * )) or V(S (x), H 1 (cd)) = S (v). Then, the first condition of our semantic criterion implies that Pr[cd r ← hH 1 .dom; b r ← T (hH, C, y, cd, f ) : b = 1∧{H 1 (cd) = H 1 (S (t * ))∨V(S (x), H 1 (cd)) = S (v)}] is negligible.
-If the tester answers properly for cd, namely so that H 1 (cd) = H 1 (S (t * )) and V(S (x), H 1 (cd)) = S (v), we can safely assume that cd = S (t * ), for the probability of collisions is negligible in the random oracle model. Then, as we know that out K = S (out d ), the computation of the plaintext corresponding to cd achieved by algorithm Ext is not accurate. But according to condition 2, Pr[Ext(hH, C, y, S (t * ), f ) = S (out d )] is negligible.
In terms of probabilities, this can be written as follows: Pr[Event I] = We can bound the first probability by (η) for condition 1 provides its negligibility. The second term is split once more according to whether cd = S (t * ). The last term is negligible because it would mean a collision for the hash oracle and we work in the random oracle model. Besides, to bound the second term, we simply notice as stated above that under all these conditions, we have Ext(hH, C, y, S (t * ), f ) = S (out d ), thus the term is less than Pr[Ext(hH, C, y, S (t * ), f ) = S (out d )], which is negligible according to condition 2. We thus have Pr[Event I] = cd∈hH 1 .dom ( (η) + (η) + (η)) ≤ Card(hH 1 .dom)( (η) + (η) + (η)) ≤˜ (η) since the cardinality of hH 1 .dom is bounded by the time of execution of the adversary, that we assumed ran in polynomial time. Thus we have proved that Pr[Event I] is negligible.
Pr[Event I] =
Let us study Event II, when the plaintext extractor outputs a plaintext whereas the decryption oracle returns error. The fact that the plaintext extractor outputs something implies that there exists at least a value of cd for which T (hH, C, y, cd, f ) = 1. However, the decryption oracle answers error. The only possibility for this to happen is that the tester is mistaken about the value cd: otherwise, V(S (x), H 1 (cd)) = S (v) and H 1 (cd) = H 1 (S (t * )) would hold, so that V(S (x), H 1 (S (t * ))) = S (v) would be true and the decryption oracle cannot possibly output error. Consequently, we have But condition 1 provides the negligibility of this latter probability. Thus Pr[Event II] ≤ Card(hH 1 .dom) (η), which is negligible too.
Finally, let us analyze what can happen for Event III to occur. The fact that S (out d ) = error implies that V(S (x), H 1 (S (t * ))) = S (v). We know that S (t * ) ∈ T H 1 , since at least the decryption oracle queried H 1 . According to who asked the hash oracle on this value, we are able to bound the probability. We thus write T H 1 as the disjoint union T H 1 = hH 1 (E q − hH 1 ) (D q − E q − hH 1 ), where E q denotes queries of the encryption oracle and D q denotes those of the decryption oracle.
-If S (t * ) ∈ hH 1 , B queried H 1 on this value. But out K = error implies the tester T answered 0 when asked about this value of the candidate, whereas the sanity check held.
